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Introduction and Abstract 
A recent Financial Times survey indicates that the financial services sector (in mainstream terms) is 
concerned about the disruptive1 potential of several digital-based technologies as applied to 
financial services, such as blockchain, big data and robo-advisers.2 Not to mention that we have 
already of late witnessed the emergence of high frequency algorithmic trading, novel consumer 
payment devices, online crowdfunding and peer-to-peer lending. Financial technology seems to be 
ushering in an order for upheaval, and is defined by Price Waterhouse Coopers as ‘a dynamic 
segment at the intersection of the financial services and technology sectors where technology-
focused start-ups and new market entrants innovate the products and services currently provided by 
the traditional financial services industry’.3 Nevertheless, financial technology is not a new concept 
and should be understood in broader terms. From the development of stock exchanges that 
facilitate corporate fund-raising to the development of wholesale money markets,4 financial 
technology is financial innovation intertwined with legal technology to change the way finance is 
conducted,5 oftentimes as a form of disruptive innovation. ‘Disruptive innovation’ in Bower and 
Christensen’s framework,6 refers to the creation of new markets and value networks that eventually 
disrupt existing markets and value networks, displacing established market leaders and alliances. 
Financial technology is a history of many culminating moments of disruption. The current wave of 
‘fintech’ specifically focuses on the embedment of digital technology into financial technology, 
different aspects of which have, to larger or smaller extents, also required innovation in legal 
technology.7 
By contextualising ‘fintech’ against the broader historical backdrop in financial technology, this 
article intends to offer high-level perspectives in order to frame the understanding of the disruptive 
potential of fintech, and the implications for financial regulation. Using the framework of disruptive 
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innovation in a widely understood sense,8 the article focuses on potential revolutions9 of products, 
intermediaries or markets and the regulatory implications of such. The article will not examine in 
detail particular areas of fintech, but will draw from a range of examples and their key features. The 
disruptive potential of fintech will be discussed to highlight market themes, changes in legal 
technology and regulatory implications, in respect of (a) financial product development, (b) financial 
intermediation interfaces and/or (c) financial markets and value networks. In this way, we can 
critically appreciate to what extent and in what respects fintech is disruptive, and whether its 
disruption is relevant to financial regulatory objectives. 
This overview article, which provides a framework for analysing the disruptive potential of fintech 
and regulatory implications, is envisaged to be an anchor for more specific pieces that examine 
particular areas of fintech in more detail. We believe that such a high level perspective is necessary 
so as to introduce a more coherent blueprint for regulatory thinking and design, avoiding silo-based 
and narrowly reactive approaches to increasingly complex financial innovation.  
Part A of the article sketches the nature and development of financial innovation, outlining the 
drivers, achievements and dark sides of financial innovation. It critically suggests a framework of 
‘disruptive innovation’ for understanding the regulatory implications of financial innovation. 
Financial innovation could be a flash in the pan or introduce enduring change, so the first indicia for 
regulatory implications could be the ‘disruptive’ nature of the financial innovation concerned. We 
introduce a framework for regulatory thinking and evaluation of ‘disruptive finance’- in terms of the 
nature of the ‘change’ observed, its ‘substitutive potential’ and its ‘structural impact’. Parts B, C and 
D then discuss these aspects as applied to selected fintech innovations in financial products, services 
and markets. Part E concludes. 
A. A Framework for Disruptive Financial Innovation 
Finance can be thought of as “a derivative of social and political needs, engineered by economic 
theories, computational and data driven technologies”.10 It is a conjuration of economic, legal and 
increasingly information-based technologies, but put simply, a means to meet certain ends. Hence, 
finance continually evolves through financial innovation, and the topical development of ‘fintech’ 
should be understood in that context. As Avgouleas points out, from fractional reserve banking to 
the rise of securities exchanges, from securitisation of assets to high frequency trading, financial 
innovation is an ongoing and unceasing phenomenon.11 Financial innovation is driven by a mixture of 
firm-based characteristics and wider environment factors, as well as by individual incentives and 
entrepreneurial moments. Many financial innovations can also be thought of as ‘disruptive’ as they 
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usher in new products, new ways of effecting transactions and intermediation, new institutions and 
organisational forms and may permanently change the landscape of finance.  
A Brief History of Financial Innovation 
A survey of the literature on what drives financial innovation shows the culmination of a mixture of 
factors. Contextual factors are important such as the regulatory and tax environments,12 the 
economic policies of globalisation and capital liberalisation,13 and the knowledge revolutions in 
economic, legal, communications and digital technologies.14 In particular, regulatory environments 
can promote financial innovation by either being facilitative15  or indeed restrictive, and therefore 
incentivising regulatory arbitrage.16 We will return shortly to discussing regulatory arbitrage as an 
incentive for financial innovation. Knowledge revolutions are especially relevant to the development 
of financial innovation by non-incumbents who may pioneer or kickstart  new products, processes, 
interfaces and markets altogether.17 Further, the patterns of market demand also drive financial 
innovation, as it is suggested that investors’ demands for safe, highly liquid yet high return 
investment products are what drive much of financial innovation.18  
Financial innovation, as entrepreneurial moments, are also driven by firm-based factors19 that 
interact with the wider context, usually seeking to improve efficiencies such as the reduction of 
agency and transaction costs 20 or to improve the competitive advantage of the firm. In particular, 
Awrey21 proposes a supply-side theory of financial innovation that posits that financial innovation is 
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driven by intermediaries’ need to create monopolies over their products in order to extract 
maximum rents in an extremely competitive environment.   
Perverse incentives are nevertheless crucial to driving the design and purpose of financial innovation. 
The profit incentive drives a significant amount of financial innovation that entails gambling 
behaviour for short-term gains. Speculation with ‘other people’s money’ that may produce profits in 
the short term has changed the nature of derivatives from being hedging instruments to being 
gambling instruments.22 Much of financial innovation is poised to exploit investors’ value 
misperceptions in order to make short-term gains for financial intermediaries.23 Further, financial 
innovations resulting in complex investment products are motivated largely by profit incentives with 
little regard for the consequences for mis-selling.24 A number of empirical researchers have also 
found that the development of highly leveraged products, such as synthetic exchange-traded funds 
serve primarily speculative purposes instead of genuinely beneficial economic purposes.25  
Regulatory arbitrage is a major driver of financial innovation.26 For example, the development of 
processes to liquefy long-term relationship-based assets such as mortgage loans into liquid, 
standardised marketable securities has been motivated by the desire to evade stringent capital 
adequacy rules imposed on banks.27 Nevertheless, financial innovation that seeks to moderate the 
effects of regulation could also be seen as a way to manage the risk of policy or regulatory 
uncertainty.28 There are two faces with regulatory arbitrage, one relating to evasion of laws and 
rules, in the worst case, with intentions towards facilitating illegal behaviour,29 and the other a 
genuine effort at moderating cost, maintaining efficiency or competitive advantages in the face of 
laws and rules that create impeding effects for business. More often than not regulatory arbitrage is 
a phenomenon that should be understood along a spectrum of the two opposite aspects. 
Against the backdrop of the mixture of factors that drive financial innovation, it is no surprise that 
financial innovation has yielded mixed results in terms of social benefit and harm. Many 
commentators agree that much of financial innovation produces efficiency and widening access to 
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consumers.30 For example, Kling points out that cost-effective fixed rate mortgages for consumers 
would not be possible without the financial innovation of interest rate hedging derivative products.31 
Empirical research has found that cost-savings for financial institutions derived from financial 
innovation are often passed onto investors and borrowers.32 Financial innovation that transforms 
asset characteristics such as in terms of liquidity and marketability also help in broadening financing 
opportunities for borrowers whether households or corporations. 33For example, the development 
of exchange-traded funds has improved liquidity and investor access to otherwise less liquid 
products.34 At a more macro level, Beck et al show that financial innovation correlates with increases 
in a country’s growth opportunities and GDP per capita,35 and is important for emerging economies 
in their development.36 
On the other hand, the catalogue of potential social harms from financial innovation range from the 
micro-level to the systemic level. One of the key trends in financial innovation, more to be discussed 
shortly, is the increasing marketisation of financial assets. Although such marketisation promotes 
access and improves the liquidity characteristics of assets, the apparent benefits of marketisation 
are often oversold. A balanced view is not taken with regard to the changed nature or increased risks 
of the assets, such as in securitised products. Some perverse consequences of securitisation are a 
decline in lending standards, information asymmetry between investors and originators, and a 
failure to monitor the performance of underlying assets.37 Often financial innovation is supported or 
permitted without due consideration for such unintended consequences.  
Further, financial innovation could be used in predatory schemes or could be misused to further self-
interested and anti-social motivations. Financial innovation can be used to repackage riskier or less 
liquid assets into apparently risk-managed, liquid and highly desirable assets in order to exploit 
investors. Over-selling of such marginally suitable products could ultimately result in mis-selling 
scandals.38 Further, financial innovation such as high frequency trading are a double-edged sword, as 
on the one hand it can facilitate lightning fast and efficient trading, and hence improves market 
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quality,39 it could also be abused by ‘pingers’ and ‘spoofers’ who test the market but have no 
genuine desire to transact,40 not to mention making markets more susceptible to vulnerabilities that 
could culminate in unexplained ‘flash crashes’.41 
Finally, a number of commentators are of the view that financial innovation correlates with 
increased systemic risk for the financial and economic systems. Financial innovation often involves 
more credit creation. Such increases in leverage as a systemic phenomenon often creates greater 
risk for all participants in the financial and real economies, and could raise systemic fragility in the 
face of shocks or crises.42 Further, financial innovation also produces more complexity, which makes 
systems and markets more susceptible to systemic effects. As identified by commentators,43 
complexity often exacerbates information asymmetry resulting in mispriced allocations in the 
market, asset bubbles, and painful corrections and market instability. Further, the marketisation 
aspect so prevalent in much of financial innovation causes assets to be subject to market risk and to 
behavioural reactions that exacerbate market risk. Such marketisation, which transforms assets from 
relationship-based ones to marketable ones, inevitably foregoes the erstwhile flexibility underlying 
relationship-based assets that can be beneficial for managing defaults and crises.44 In sum, increases 
in financial fragility and systemic risk seem to be the trade-off for supporting financial innovation. 
Further, Blair also points out that financial innovation has created patterns of wealth distribution 
that are concentrated upon the financial elite while risks have correspondingly increased for 
ordinary investors.45 
As financial innovation seems to be a double-edged sword, and in Awrey’s words, ‘welfare-
indeterminate’,46 the regulatory engagement with financial innovation has always been one of 
relative passivity and catch-up.  Regulators, cautious of not impeding the development of 
competitive innovation and choice for consumers, often dismantle regulatory barriers to support 
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competition, or refrain from adding such barriers.47  This is because much of financial innovation 
depends on low cost and flexible models, which would be stifled by the high cost of regulation.48 
Thus, regulators often take a ‘wait and see’ approach, preferring to monitor developments 
regulating financial innovation. Regulators may also adopt informal approaches49 or soft law, in 
order to be flexible in governing financial innovation.50  However, such an approach risks prolonged 
regulatory inertia,51 and would also mean that regulatory developments are reactive, with the 
possibility of swinging extremely to risk aversion if failures or scandals arise.  
After the global financial crisis 2007-9, global regulators now disfavour an excessively laissez-faire or 
reactive approach in financial regulation.52 They have developed more forward-looking regulatory 
frameworks to monitor and sometimes pre-empt certain developments. In this respect, regulators 
now have forward-looking product intervention powers53 to intervene in product distribution where 
this may be warranted for investor protection. Product intervention powers have been used by the 
UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) to prevent sales of banks’ contingent convertible bonds to 
retail investors,54 and in Europe, the European Securities and Markets Authority has exercised similar 
powers by requiring more stringent investor disclosures for the sales of indexed and exchange-
traded funds.55 However, regulators are also equipped with more benign, softer powers such as the 
FCA’s ‘regulatory sandbox’56 which allow financial innovation to be carried out in experimental ways 
within the parameters of regulatory approval and monitoring. Further, besides correcting for 
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previous regulatory gaps,57 regulators seem willing to take more formal steps in regulatory 
governance over shadow banking developments58 or limiting certain transactions to the wholesale 
sector,59 so as to introduce forms of proportionate governance without excessive regulation. The 
evolution of financial regulation has come a long way from merely being facilitative of market 
efficiency60 to a point where other public interest objectives pervade, such as financial and market 
stability. The regulatory regime has become a bedrock of the financial sector architecture itself. 
Hence financial innovation is necessarily studied within the paradigm of regulatory implications.  
In this new phase of regulatory dynamics vis a vis financial innovation, this article proposes that 
‘disruptive innovation’ could provide a framework for considering the regulatory implications of 
fintech.61 We argue that it is helpful to develop a high-level framework that provides some indicia for 
considering whether and to what extent regulatory intervention in financial innovation should take 
place. We draw from general business innovation literature to derive such insights that can be of 
enduring value.  
Disruptive Innovation as a Framework for Studying the Governance Implications for Financial 
Innovation 
‘Disruptive innovation’62 refers to the creation of new markets and value networks that eventually 
disrupt existing markets and value networks, displacing established market leaders and alliances. 
This framework may be more specifically understood as the development of innovation that first 
takes place at the low end of the market, which does not immediately threaten incumbents as it is a 
weak substitute. The innovation however distinguishes itself by new performance criteria to the 
market, such as convenience and portability, lower price, or ease of use. The gradual uptake by the 
market and development of economies of scale stealthily allow the innovation to become dominant 
in due course, disrupting and replacing incumbents. In later literature, commentators have sought to 
broaden the concept of ‘disruptive innovation’.63 This is because some innovations produce 
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 by not confining to developments in the same sector or necessarily starting at the low end of the market, or 
adopting a gradual trajectory of displacement. 
disruptive effects of introducing novelty and displacing incumbents in different ways but reach the 
same result. 64  
Focusing on the outcome characteristics of disruptive innovation, it may be understood as ‘[involving] 
significant new technologies, requir[ing] considerable change in consumption patterns and are 
perceived as offering substantially enhanced benefits’.65  In this manner, the key characteristics of 
‘disruption’ connote of genuine ‘change’ with substitutive potential that ultimately produces 
structural impact.  
‘Change’ is defined as achieving a difference in performance and value (especially to customers) 
whether it is achieved by a product, process, functional, service or utility change.66  Sometimes 
change is symptomatic i.e. in methodologies and processes. Other changes may be more substantive, 
such as customer preferences or shifting the bases of competition. A genuinely disruptive change 
would be one, whether symptomatic or substantive, which would result in significant market or 
structural impact upon the industry.67  
Substitutive potential can arise whether or not the disruption comes from the same sector, or 
outside of the given sector, as long as the function of substitution may be achieved.68  Such 
substitution could be in relation to financial products, intermediation processes or interfaces, or 
financial markets. 
 ‘Structural impact’ refers to how the change and substituting innovation eventually creates 
significant repercussions at industry level and causes structural change to the industry itself.69 Such 
impact should be pervasive70 in order to be significant and not merely a flash in the pan. Studying 
impact can however can take time as ‘change’ and ‘substitution’ can undergo a process of 
institutionalisation which may not be easily foreseen.  
We argue that the ‘disruptive innovation’ framework gives rise to these three elements ‘change’, 
‘substitutive potential’ and ‘structural impact’ that can inform regulatory thinking. A framework for 
regulatory thinking is useful to prevent forward-looking or ‘judgment-based’ regulation71 from being 
either too passive or precautionary. 
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First, regulators should discern what ‘change’ in performance or value the financial innovation has 
brought about. For example, in relation to substantive change, regulators should be interested if 
new channels for meeting financial needs are being created, and where new, unlicensed 
intermediaries are introduced in the landscape. Regulators should also take heed if new financial 
needs are being defined and framed, and the extent of market uptake. In terms of symptomatic 
change, regulators should take note if existing channels for meeting financial needs are being 
changed in forms or interfaces, and whether such forms or interfaces are captured within existing 
regulation. Regulators should also discern if there are changes in legal technology, such as in 
defining legal relationships, property rights, enforcement rights, in order ascertain if any substantive 
change has indeed come about in banking or investment paradigms. 
Next, the ‘substitutive potential’ of ‘change’ can be highly indicative to regulators as to whether the 
change is significant enough to be monitored and considered for regulatory initiatives. The 
‘disruptive innovation’ model anticipates a form of stealthy but dominant substitution. However, 
even if a change does become fully substitutive, we are of the view that significant migration effects 
on the part of financial end-users should warrant regulators’ attention. Substitutive effects may have 
implications in terms of regulatory arbitrage. For example, an area that regulators ought to have 
paid great attention to prior to the global financial crisis 2007-9 was the development of 
securitisation as a means to manage long-term illiquid assets. Securitisation caused change in the 
way banks managed such long term credit risk, as it substituted long-term monitoring as the 
traditional form of risk management with marketisation and dispersion of risk. This substitutive 
effect became widespread, enduring and should have alerted regulators to monitor such change. 
This substitutive effect in bank prudential risk management can undermine existing regulatory 
frameworks in prudential regulation that focuses on assets on the books. Regulators would have 
needed a more robust regulatory framework that integrates on and off-balance sheet assets, as well 
as credit and market risk. 
Finally, regulators need to consider the structural impact of potentially substitutive forms of change. 
This is not easy to foresee especially if the change is only emerging. For example, will peer-to-peer 
lending72 become substitutive for traditional bank credit channels? The market is small73 compared 
to traditional bank credit at the moment, and the structural impact of such an industry is hard to 
foretell. However, the information analytics techniques and the investment model underlying the 
peer-to-peer lending products can become substitutive forms of change for how credit is created in 
the future. Even if the structural impact of a financial innovation is uncertain, regulators could create 
a dynamic impact map for a form of continuous monitoring to inform regulatory thinking. Much of 
financial regulation is inevitably tied to the structure of the sector,74 in terms of the characteristics of 
firms, established institutions and practices in the sector and the key features of marketplaces. 
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Substitutive changes that have a structural impact will inevitably undermine regulatory assumptions 
underlying these frameworks. Regulators need to be able to adapt to new structures in 
firms/organisations, marketplaces and intermediation practices and methodologies in order to 
review constantly if public interest objectives such as investor protection, financial stability and 
market confidence are being achieved. 
The post-crisis financial regulatory environment has become an expanded universe in terms of 
regulatory objectives.75 This is in response to the recognition that severe governance gaps have 
arisen in an era of deregulation and minimalist regulation focused on narrowly defined market-
based goals such as market efficiency.76 Blind spots have been created in relation to questions such 
as long-term financial stability, which has now formed the basis of regulatory reforms such as 
counter-cyclical prudential regulation77 and regulatory reforms designed to mitigate the adverse 
consequences of too-big-to-fail financial institutions.78 Continuing questions however evolve around 
the socio-economic legitimacy and utility of financial institutions and marketplaces,79 the ethics of 
financial intermediation,80 and the distributive consequences of financialisation.81 The regulatory 
monitoring of the ‘change’, ‘substitutive potential’ and ‘structural impact’ of financial innovation 
needs to be mapped against this dynamic landscape of the rejuvenation of financial regulation. 
Regulators should however also take into account the role of private law and informal forms of 
governance. Private law such as the law of contracts or property may protect investors82 or indeed 
achieve opposite effects, and can be used as forms of legal technology in creating governance 
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gaps.83 Regulators also act in a governance landscape that is multi-faceted and de-centred84 and 
informal governance mechanisms such as industry bodies’ guidance, shareholder activism and other 
mechanisms also need to be considered in the governance matrix. 
‘Disruptive innovation’ is an appropriate framework for this article as the focus is on fintech, which is 
currently driven by fringe movements in the financial sector or outside of the sector altogether,85 
less so by incumbent companies’ incremental innovation, in keeping with the character of Bower’s 
and Christensen’s original thesis. Further, we are also of the view that given the rapidly developing 
nature of financial innovation observed over the past decades, ‘disruptive’ forms of financial 
innovation are but the norm. Hence, we are of the view that the ‘disruptive innovation’ framework is 
arguably the only appropriate high-level framework that captures the nature and character of 
financial innovation in order to flesh out its key aspects.  
 It may be argued that the ‘disruptive innovation’ framework is too narrow as it does not encompass 
incremental forms of innovation that could achieve the same effects in terms of change, substitution 
and impact. We do not think that the use of the ‘disruptive innovation’ framework is inappropriate 
as it is used in a broader sense focused on the outcome effects of ‘change’, ‘substitution’ and 
‘structural impact’, and thus encompasses innovation trajectories that are more evolutionary in 
nature.86 This article does not foreclose the possibility that ‘disruptive innovation’ may arise from 
within an industry incumbent that changes and substitutes its existing products or services in such a 
way that structural impact is achieved.  
This article will proceed to discuss fintech innovation in financial products, services and markets by 
applying the ‘disruptive innovation’ framework to discuss the aspects of ‘change’, ‘substitutive 
potential’ and ‘structural impact’. The nature of the ‘change’, ‘substitutive potential’ and ‘structural 
impact’ of selected fintech developments is necessarily appraised against the fabric of existing 
developments and our application of the disruptive innovation framework is a highly contextualised 
approach.  
B. Financial Product Innovation 
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Financial product innovation is driven by financialisation- the increasing reliance upon finance to 
meet economic needs.87 In a political scientist’s view, ‘financialisation is the increase in the influence 
of financial markets, institutions and elites over both the economy and other institutions of society, 
including the government.’88 Financialisation corresponds with the retreat of the state in welfarism, 
leaving savers to manage their myriad savings needs including long-term retirement needs via 
investment.89  
Saving is defined as deferred consumption,90 expected to be deployed for use after accumulation, 
such as for a deposit payment for a house purchase; or for the purposes of capital formation for new 
productive activity, i.e. investment.91 In an era of financialisation, the function of saving is 
increasingly mediated by investment,92 such that investment has become the key generator of 
income for deferred consumption. In other words, saving is almost exclusively carried out through 
investment. Erturk et al93 describe financialisation as championing a form of democratic participation 
for households in the investment market, giving opportunities to and empowering households to be 
engaged in wealth generation through saving in investment.    
A key trend in financial product innovation is the broadening of investment choice. Encouraging 
savers to access financial markets is a confluence of public policy as well as the private interests of 
the financial sector. The financial sector has grown in importance, scale and profit levels with savers 
being channelled into its conduits to meet various economic needs. Two key trends in financial 
innovation which respond to such demand-led forces are the collectivisation of savings for 
investment, with phenomenal implications for financial product innovation, and the mass-selling of 
risk management products such as insurance packaged with credit or banking products.  
Collectivisation of Investment Management 
In order to meet the needs of cost-effective access to professional investment management, savings 
are organised into collective investment vehicles. Collective pooling of savings into investment funds 
ensures sufficiently affordable access to investment due to economies of scale. However, this gives 
rise to standardisation in the relational dimension between investment intermediaries and savers, 
and therefore (ironically) less prospect for tailor-made financial solutions to specific needs. Erturk et 
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al94 critically describes the rise in collective investment management as a form of ‘coupon pool’ 
capitalism where the masses become feedstock for finance. The collectivisation of savers’ capital 
into pools intermediated by financial intermediaries results in certain ramifications for the 
characterisation of the investment paradigm- investment is channelled into a collective product 
branded by the intermediary’s management competence and expertise. Savers thus invest in 
abstract ‘products’ and not identified ‘borrowers’. Savers seek accountability for their trust by 
looking at narrowly defined but comparable performance metrics applied to investment funds, and 
manage their risks by looking to the right to exit either in a secondary market or through redemption 
rights. Hence, the financial innovation of collective investment has steadily resulted in the 
transactionalisation of investment relationships and the de-socialisation of the investment products 
market in general. 95 
Investment intermediaries compete for market share and engage in marketing and branding to 
attract financial flows to themselves, Bogle96 observes that investment intermediaries have become 
focused upon capturing as much as possible of the supply of capital instead of managing such capital 
as stewards for the beneficiaries who have entrusted them. Increasingly, investment intermediaries 
and savers are focused on myopic perspectives in short-termist investment performance. 
The changing character of the investment market to be de-personalised, transactional and 
myopic/short termist is not something that regulators grasped immediately. Much of investment 
regulation in the UK continued to assume a relational paradigm in investment intermediation, 
relying on common law rules of duties of care and fiduciary duties to meet investors’ needs.97 Even 
standardised regulatory duties for investment intermediaries introduced in the EU, such as a duty of 
suitability98 for investment advice,99 is based on a relational paradigm. In the US, investment advisers 
regulated under the Investment Advisers Act 1940 owe a fiduciary duty to their clients which 
encompass aspects of loyalty and care, again emphasising the relationship basis of the intermediary-
client paradigm. Are these relational duties limited and anachronistic in the transactionalised and 
de-personalised investment environment?100 Both the UK and EU have now identified deficits in the 
relational paradigm of client accountability and we see that civil enforcement is relatively impotent 
in terms of governing investment management practices. The UK is carrying out a study into asset 
management practices and considering if further regulation may be necessary for directly governing 
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investment management practices.101 The EU has already tabled a proposal to govern one aspect of 
investment funds’ practices- the exercise of funds’ corporate governance rights in investee 
companies.102  
The substitution of private investment management for state welfarism has resulted in irreversible 
structural impact in the age of financialisation, which includes the growth of the industry of 
investment management and collectively managed products. The private organisation of collective 
investment is the prevailing paradigm for savers to meet their long-term investment needs. Law and 
regulation have been slow to catch onto the nature of the seismic change. 
Mass-selling of Consumer-based Risk Management in Packaged Products 
Another development in financial product innovation is that of bundled elements in financial 
products, such as credit, insurance and deposit all in one. Such products appeal to consumers as 
they seem to be a holistic means of meeting financial needs while balanced by appropriate risk 
management.  
The market for bundled products allows financial innovation to be commoditised103 on a large scale 
while at the same time creating cost-effective opportunities for access.104 However, marketization 
also results in certain perverse incentives towards mis-selling to financial consumers products they 
may not need.105 In this way, the financial intermediation relationships have been distorted by 
perverse incentives to become predatory and transient relationships, increasingly alienated from a 
sense of professional service.106 As many financial goods are credence goods, i.e. their performance 
or utility takes time to become apparent, it is not difficult for financial intermediaries to abuse the 
agency problem107 by making immediate sales of products for immediate gain, leaving the end-user 
to reckon with the utility of the product (or lack thereof) in the longer term. 
Bundled products are mass-sold (and mis-sold) to consumers on a phenomenal scale in the UK, and 
it has taken many years for the mis-selling of payment protection insurance and card identity 
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protection insurance products to unravel. Although they can serve genuinely useful purposes,108 
such products have been sold in an undiscriminating manner for the purposes of profit-making.109 It 
has taken years for the regulator to introduce redress mechanisms110 and to take enforcement 
actions against such mis-selling.111 The slowness and reactive nature of regulatory response is again 
an under-appreciation of the seismic change in financialisation and consumer responsibilisation, as 
increasing commoditisation of financial products and consumers have brought about a structurally 
predatory sales culture112 in the financial sector. 
The two trends discussed above have been made possible in a regulatory context where regulators 
tend not to regulate financial products directly.113 This means that financial regulation has seldom 
prescribed the features of investment products, leaving the design of such products to market forces 
and leaving it to the market to judge their quality.  The entrenched reticence with respect to product 
quality is understandable, as distortions of perception, which can be introduced by ‘regulatory 
endorsement’ should be prevented in relation to credence goods.114 However, such reticence means 
that financial intermediaries have a substantial amount of freedom to structure their products in 
accordance with their incentives and efficiency structures. The true social utility of products is likely 
affected by the principal-agent problem but the extent of this cannot be determined on an ex ante 
basis. Mis-selling is not easy to prevent in such a context. In other words, ‘tainted intermediation’ is 
a structural problem for investors navigating the choice of financial products. 
We are of the view that the structural problem of ‘tainted intermediation’ is in part due to the lack 
of regulatory engagement in the pre-crisis era with developments in product innovation. Applying 
the ‘disruptive innovation’ framework, regulators should have observed that there are (a) changes in 
financial consumption trends, (b) changes in intermediary behaviour and culture, (c) observed 
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patterns of ‘substitution’ i.e. from relationship-based to market-based financial intermediation and 
(d) the emergence of ‘structural impact’ upon the industry in terms of investment collectivisation 
and mass-selling. These indicia could have provided possibilities to reflect upon public interest needs 
and the role of regulation and governance. The commoditisation of savers and borrowers and the 
de-personalisation of the investment paradigm have caused lasting structural impact on the 
investment management industry, now characterised as short-termist115 and riddled with principal-
agent problems,116 affecting the ultimate performance and utility of products sold.  
Regulators in the UK and EU have begun to take steps to address the structural problem of ‘tainted 
intermediation’ by regulating conduct of business more stringently. The EU for example has 
introduced more prescriptive rules of investment management in its largest mutual fund industry, 
the UCITs, 117  and in conduct of business in advice and distribution generally.118 The UK has in 
addition to adopting those rules also imposed its own regime of retail distribution,119 banning 
product commissions and forcing investment advisers to be directly remunerated by their clients so 
as to minimise conflicts of interest at the advisory stage. However, there is still relatively little 
regulatory thinking on the nature and purposes of the financial products themselves, although 
‘product intervention’ powers, as mentioned earlier, have been introduced to prevent potential mis-
selling. 
Against this context, fintech is leading a new wave of financial product innovation towards 
reconstructing the relational basis in the investment paradigm, re-connecting savers and borrowers 
directly. Will this provide a much-needed balance to the deficiencies of the current landscape for 
retail financial products? We sketch the major key features of these new products and highlight 
issues for consideration in terms of the regulation and governance. 
Fintech and Financial Product Innovation 
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New financial products that cater to investors fashion themselves as unconnected to the 
conventional banking industry that has fallen into disrepute since the global financial crisis 2007-9. 
They are also marketed as being able to provide alternative returns opportunities in a relatively low 
interest rate environment.120 Two key innovations, online crowdfunding and peer-to-peer financial 
services have arisen to be popular retail investment options of late, and create appeal by 
distinguishing themselves as being exclusively online interfaces, using digital information technology 
to change how financial products are offered. These new products also seem to differentiate 
themselves from the collectivisation and mass-selling culture discussed above. These products 
encourage direct consumer interfaces and evaluation, and seem to tease the consumer into a sense 
of empowerment and engaged selection. However, we suggest that these products are in early days 
of development. The sense of refreshing ‘alternativeness’ offered by these products inherently 
contains a trade-off for the consumer- a higher degree of responsibilisation and diligence is required. 
Moreover, these products do not yet benefit from the standardised regulatory protections attached 
to established products in advice and distribution. Further, the ‘alternativeness’ of these products 
may be over-sold. These products are often structured as collective products in which consumers 
participate, and so the submergence of individual consumers into a ‘pool’ is the same investment 
structure as that which persists in the mainstream. The increasingly popularity of such products 
could also lead to more standardisation and ‘mass-selling’.  
Online crowdfunding allows individuals to participate in funding a project, by pooling small 
contributions together. The project could be a civic movement, a cultural project, a community 
development or a small business. Crowdfunders do not share ownership of the project but instead 
enjoy gifts or tokens of appreciation from the project owners and managers.121 This means of fund-
raising has become popular with small businesses and with investors- small businesses are able to 
raise important though small sums for starting up and developing, while not being subject to 
expensive compliance requirements under securities regulation,122 and investors enjoy the appeal of 
selecting the recipient of their funding as a matter of personal choice. In fact, commentators point 
out that such investment choices are socially embedded, involving elements of consideration for 
social or public worthiness,123 relational dimensions such as being family or friends of the finance-
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seeker,124 and other factors that are not economically rational, such as being supportive of the local 
community125 or heeding an online herding trend.126 
Online peer-to-peer (P2P) financial services, of which the most significant is P2P lending in consumer 
credit,127 allows individuals to post information on an online platform in order to attract lenders. 
Typically lenders may finalise a price for the loan ie interest rate and duration, through an open 
auction process or through posting,128 and would only take fractions of the total amount sought. 
Hence, the online platform brokers a syndicated loan for the loan-seeker, charging a fee for such 
brokering service, as well as servicing of the payments made. The loans may range from 12-60 
months in duration, and the lenders bear the risk of default. 
Online crowdfunding and P2P financial services are a growing sector, and major players such as the 
Lending Club Corporation and On Deck Capital in the US have already listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange. Regulators, anxious that financial innovation should not be unduly stifled, have been 
tentative on governing these areas. In the US, the JOBS Act creates exemptions for online 
crowdfunding if certain investor protection thresholds are met, and eases some requirements for 
P2P platforms imposed by the Securities Exchange Commission in terms of filing prospectuses.129 In 
the UK, P2P lenders are subject to a modified version of capital adequacy and disclosure 
requirements that are proportionate for their business, 130 while online crowdfunding platforms 
need to ensure that certain investor protections are achieved, such as marketing largely to 
sophisticated investors and limiting the exposure of retail investors’ net assets to such 
opportunities.131  
Regulators are taking restrained approaches to govern the new fintech products in a highly 
derivative manner from existing regulatory regimes. This approach may be based on a presumption 
that the issues that may arise from such financial innovation are the same, or that the regulatory 
objectives are equivalent. Hence, the UK FCA’s reliance on capital adequacy requirements to govern 
P2P lenders, mimicking banking regulation, and the reliance placed by both the US SEC and UK FCA 
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on disclosure and exempt offerings under securities regulation to deal with online crowdfunding.132 
The broad critique against such approaches is that they are derivative in nature and such an 
approach is questionable in terms of its wisdom to deal with new issues. That said, such regulatory 
regimes are by no means finalised and the article does not engage in a protracted critique of 
regulatory regimes that are only emerging. Instead, we propose using the ‘disruptive innovation’ 
framework above to flesh out the key ‘changes’, ‘substitutive potential’ and ‘structural impact’ that 
are relevant for regulatory monitoring. 
A ‘Disruptive Innovation’ Model in Understanding the Implications of Fintech Product Innovation 
As discussed above, ‘tainted intermediation’ is a structural problem for investors navigating the 
choice of financial products. Financial products based on fintech innovation may offer a refreshing 
option. Using a disruptive innovation framework, we discuss below how online crowdfunding and 
P2P lending introduces ‘change’, ‘substitutive potential’ and ‘structural impact’ for regulatory 
consideration. 
In terms of ‘change’, online crowdfunding and P2P lending models offer direct access to retail 
investors for many small amounts of contribution, hence commentators describe this feature as a 
form of ‘disintermediation’.133 The benefit of disintermediation is the reconstruction of the 
relationship between borrower and saver directly. Besides such disintermediation seems available at 
a cost that is affordable, 134 through platform-based technologies that are able to match the supply 
and demand sides of capital, and even offer comparative information, choice and access.135 Does 
such ‘disintermediation’ offer a powerful alternative to the existing structures of intermediation?  
We are sceptical of the empowering claims of disintermediation for ultimate borrowers and 
savers/lenders.136 This is because these products significantly change the patterns in risk allocation. 
Using online crowdfunding and P2P portals, investors vet their investees/borrowers directly using 
information posted and determine whether or not to extend their contribution, hence bearing in full 
the credit, as well as market risks associated with their investment. This is a change from the full 
intermediation model offered by depositary banks and partial intermediation models offered by 
investment firms which are subject to a range of disclosure, conduct of business rules and portfolio 
composition rules.137 Regulators need to be mindful of the public interest implications from such a 
change in risk allocation, and consider whether investors’ expectations are commensurate with the 
risk levels they are assuming. Further, does private law address investors’ needs if they should wish 
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to take enforcement action against their borrowers or lending platforms? Regulators should be 
mindful that these products are ultimately collective investment products where individual 
investments are aggregated and investors may not have an individual ‘claim’ against the borrower. 
Without going into length in this paper and notwithstanding this to be an important question, 
private law actions are highly arguable as the collective nature of the investment and the lack of a 
form of securities regulation makes any individual claim more difficult to sustain against the 
borrower. Further the limited nature of the platform’s intermediation role also makes it difficult to 
sustain conduct of business claims against them. At a basic level, investors must appreciate that 
there is a concomitant shift in risk allocation towards them with potentially lower levels of investor 
protection.  
Nevertheless, the social embedment of online crowdfunding and P2P lending may infuse investment 
decisions with considerations beyond efficiency and economic viability. These factors may make 
such financial markets more diverse and less prone to systemic herding forces that pervade many 
conventional financial markets. However, how the social underpinnings of such investments would 
work out in balancing the financial eco-system is uncertain, and what other unintended 
consequences may entail need to be studied.  
Moreover, online crowdfunding and P2P pending platforms are changing the way a lending or 
investment decision is made. Empirical research has produced mixed results as to how robustly 
lenders and investors accurately process information posted about the borrower/investee prospects. 
Research has indicated that information technology breakthroughs have allowed lenders/investors 
to better assess the credit risk of borrowers/investees,138 but at the same time, research has also 
found that lenders/investors rely on impressionistic short-hand information such as prospects’ 
appearance to make decisions.139 Such de-standardisation and subjectivisation is not based on 
robust assumptions of retail lenders’ and investors’ assessment of information and decision-making. 
There are potential investor protection and market stability issues that may require regulatory 
monitoring in such a de-standardised and subjective market interface. 
In terms of ‘substitutive potential’, it may be argued that online crowdfunding and P2P lending are 
unlikely to be able to coordinate very large amounts. Hence traditional banks and investment banks 
continue to play an important part in large scale finance such as in corporate and project finance. 
The substitutive potential is greatest for smaller amounts, i.e. small business and individual 
consumer credit.140 However, regulators need to monitor these areas even if the amounts involved 
are not phenomenal. This is because areas of consumer credit and small business finance command 
social attention and public interest concern - scandals that arise in these quarters often trigger 
significant social response.  
Finally, in terms of structural impact, we see the online crowdfunding and P2P lending models as 
ushering in two key structural trends. One is the use of information analytics to automate much of 
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financial communications and intermediation, and the other is the consolidation of innovative and 
conventional forms of financial intermediation in bringing about new transformations. 
Online crowdfunding and P2P lending platforms provide a significant amount of information to 
lenders/investors, whether posted by the prospects themselves or linked to social networking sites, 
where the prospects may be vetted as individuals, and not just according to standardised financial 
information.141 Information technology breakthroughs may be able to achieve efficiency in data 
analytics, the use of big data, and transform how investment market interfaces work. The ‘levelling’ 
of information asymmetry made possible by such data analytics revolutions could go towards 
mitigating one of the entrenched features of the principal-agent problem in ‘tainted intermediation’. 
Investors could be given more and relevant information, and be in a position to demand more 
transparency too.  
Conventional banking and investment firms are starting to adopt such new interfaces and 
methodology used by online crowdfunding and P2P lending platforms, having a transformative 
effect upon financial sector intermediation more widely. Further, the consolidation of fringe or 
alternative fintech businesses into mainstream financial groups could also result in structural 
transformation in the industry. We already see Lending Club tying up with Union Bank in order to 
achieve a public flotation, and banks taking stakes in P2P lenders in order to use the P2P front to 
grow their market shares.142  
We are of the view that fintech products have the potential to countervail some aspects of sub-
optimal principal-agent problems in conventional financial intermediation. However, their novelty 
and disintermediated interfaces bring investor protection issues more sharply into focus, making 
regulators more anxious about their governance implications. Regulators need to study the key 
change in risk allocation and compare with the relative merits and deficiencies of mainstream 
intermediation where structural principal-agent problems are rife. Regulators should also monitor 
the footprint of the new fintech-based products to determine in what areas of credit they have a 
substitutive effect and whether such substitutive potential could become structurally significant. In 
that light, regulators can then determine the scope of the necessary regulatory perimeter for these 
new fintech-based products and the design of regulatory governance in order to achieve an 
appropriate degree of investor protection and financial stability. 
We do not present presumptively a blueprint for how online crowdfunding or P2P lending ought to 
be governed, only fleshing out relevant issues using the ‘disruptive innovation’ framework to 
develop regulatory thinking. We believe that this approach is better able to inform reasoned policy-
making that does not merely address the symptomatic or is derivative in nature.  
C. Financial Intermediation Interfaces and Processes 
Financial intermediation processes are subject to constant evolution and innovation, in response to 
market and regulatory changes. New intermediary entities, new processes and methodologies in 
asset, risk and liquidity transformations, and new interfaces of engagement with investors 
                                                          
141
 Rajkamal Iyer Asim Ijaz Khwaja Erzo F. P. Luttmer Kelly Shue, ‘Screening in New Credit Markets: Can 
Individual Lenders Infer Borrower Creditworthiness in Peer-to-Peer Lending?’ (2009) at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1570115. 
142
 Eg Auswide Bank in Australia taking a 20% stake in Moneyplace, a P2P lender. 
characterise the nature of innovation in financial intermediation. These changes have been driven by 
the needs of operational cost-effectiveness and efficiency, consumer demand for certain attributes 
of their experience, such as speed, simplicity and easy access, the forces of competition and 
breakthroughs in financial, legal and digital technology. Investors have moved from relying on a bank 
branch manager’s investment advice143 to using external systems of rating such as credit ratings for 
corporate debt and securities.144 Short-term borrowing by banks has moved from inter-bank lending 
arrangements to highly developed wholesale money markets where short-term borrowing is 
financed by collateral and can be obtained from money market funds, asset managers other 
wholesale sector institutions.145 Financial innovation has also developed many changes to user 
interfaces, from the bank teller to the automated teller machine and internet banking. Investors are 
shifting from face-to-face investment advice sessions to automated advice portals or robo-advisers 
and online execution-only products.  
The new wave of financial innovation led by fintech continues along some common themes that 
have persisted through the years of financial intermediation evolution. Two key themes are 
disintermediation (and re-intermediation) and automation.  
Disintermediation? 
Disintermediation often refers to innovations that allow the by-passing of existing middlemen so 
that the entities at the end of the supply and demand chain (i.e. savers/investors and 
borrowers/fund raisers) could meet directly.146 In finance, ‘middlemen’ or intermediaries may 
perform a variety of roles. French and Leyschon describe these as ‘Type I’, ‘Type 2’ and ‘Type 3’ 
roles.147 Type 1 roles refer largely to intermediation in terms of information and transaction costs. 
For example, the use of a broker to execute purchases and sales of securities is a Type 1 
intermediation. The broker engages in information intermediation for the investor, informing the 
investor of buy and sell research, and carries out the execution of the investor’s trade. Type 1 
intermediation is essentially of a brokerage nature.  
Type 2 intermediation involves a form of asset transformation, usually in respect of liquidity. For 
example, the full intermediation performed by banks that take customer deposits on an on-demand 
basis148 in order to transform deposits into long-term loans. More recent types of transformations 
include securitisation, which is the transformation of illiquid and relationship-based assets like 
mortgage loans into more standardised and marketable securities that can be sold more widely to 
investors. Collective investment is also a Type 2 intermediation. 
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Type 3 intermediation involves efficiency transformation. For example, banks have been challenged 
by credit card companies in respect of payments and consumer credit since the 1980s, and these 
incumbents are now being challenged by digital payment systems developed by fintech companies 
such as Amazon, Google and Alipay. 
Disintermediation has been understood by different commentators in different ways. One line of 
literature views disintermediation as primarily a move away from using bank-based intermediation 
towards other intermediaries that are capital markets-based.149 The implications from such a move 
are significant for regulatory regimes that have primarily focused on bank regulation. These include 
considerations of regulatory arbitrage,150 i.e. whether such intermediaries are managing similar risks 
like banks and ought to be regulated in a similar manner, via the extension of prudential 
regulation;151 whether the risk allocation between such intermediaries and investors has changed 
and hence give rise to a need to look into gaps in investor protection;152 and generally reviewing if 
sectoral forms of regulation that focus excessively on banks need to be recalibrated in scope and 
application.153 
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Another line of literature is more business-oriented and looks into whether the supply and demand 
sides for investment capital are actually able to transact directly without the assistance of Types 1, 2 
or 3 intermediaries.154 For example, one could argue that the development of online platforms 
allows insurance purchasers to buy directly from insurance companies and hence the role of the 
insurance broker is subject to disintermediation. This is a form of Type 1 disintermediation, where 
the internet revolution facilitates more effective access to information, thus giving insurance 
purchasers the tools to bypass the insurance broker. Nevertheless, we observe that new providers 
arise to offer services to compare features and premiums for insurance products, hence consumers 
may prefer to use an online comparison site155 in order to decide which insurance products to buy. 
In this sense, the apparent disintermediation we observed is only temporary, giving rise to new re-
intermediation by new or existing providers. Even if the internet has revolutionised information 
access, information gathering and analysis is still a time-consuming exercise, and the room for re-
intermediation has quickly been filled up by fintech innovation in the form of comparison and rating 
sites.  
One may also see the advent of the blockchain technology as being able to introduce real 
disintermediation in financial investment transactions. This is because blockchain, which is a 
distributed ledger technology, allows the supply and demand sides of capital to meet online and to 
execute transactions as a private arrangement verified and sealed by secure cryptographic 
technology maintained by volunteer software engineers.156 The use of blockchain technology to 
execute and confirm transactions ensures that the veracity of such transactions are not dependent 
on the settlement, clearing and centralised custodial systems underlying securities markets, hence 
we can bypass the existing financial intermediation infrastructure.157 Although the distributed ledger 
technology has genuine disintermediating effects, it does not offer information intermediation or 
asset, maturity and liquidity transformation. Hence, an investor that seeks those services are unlikely 
to be able to avoid using financial intermediaries altogether. Disintermediation is not only about the 
technological capabilities offered for the purpose, it correspondingly requires increased due 
diligence, oversight and increased endeavour and responsibility on the part of investors. These 
trade-offs do not make it certain that investors would opt for disintermediating options and relegate 
financial intermediaries to obsolescence. 
Where Types 1 and 3 disintermediation are concerned, commentators are sceptical that there has 
been real disintermediation of a lasting impact. Even if certain intermediation processes and 
interfaces can be disrupted by cheaper and more accessible alternatives, the cost of information 
mediation and transaction formation are not eliminated. Disintermediation only gives rise to re-
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intermediation,158 and as Lin observes, finance is a persistent state of ‘infinite intermediation’.159 
Gialdini and Lenglet describe the persistence of financial intermediation as being due to the need for 
translators of processes to bring together the supply and demand sides for investment capital, and 
this hermeneutic function is a form of sense-making in order to help each side achieve their ends.160 
For example, payment users who switch from credit cards to google pay are not supporting 
disintermediation as such, but re-intermediation. The recognition of the reality of disintermediation 
as being a largely transitional process to re-intermediation would help regulators in conceptualising 
the scope of regulatory regimes and to consider conduct risks in new re-intermediary relationships. 
For example, the UK FCA is monitoring how new information intermediaries like price comparison 
websites influence consumer behaviour and are looking into ensuring that their conduct is fair and 
aboveboard.161 Price comparison websites can be incentivised to influence consumer behaviour 
under conflicts of interest, for example by placing certain search results high in the list where these 
are from providers that pay them commissions. The FCA has brought price comparison websites 
within its regulatory perimeter.162 It has further conducted a thematic review in 2014 revealing 
failings in price comparison websites’ conduct, such as making recommendations about best 
products to buy without explaining clearly the basis for doing so.163  
In terms of Type 2 disintermediation, Lin is of the view that asset transformation functions are highly 
sophisticated and difficult to disintermediate fully.164  This is because the benefits of such 
disintermediation are less clear cut. Although investors may pay less fees for relatively 
disintermediated investment options such as P2P lending, investors do not enjoy the risk 
management and asset transformation offered by Type 2 intermediaries such as mutual and hedge 
funds.165 The lower cost of access to more highly disintermediated opportunities such as P2P lending 
has to be juxtaposed against the greater information diligence that has to be undertaken by the 
investor in light of the investor’s full assumption of credit risk. Indeed, commentators166 see that re-
intermediation trends in this industry are already arising. Credit scoring intermediaries and other 
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information mediation agents have arisen to bridge the information and diligence gaps for investors. 
Investors in this industry would still incur a set of new transaction costs.  
Automation 
A persistent trend that shapes financial intermediation methodologies and interfaces is the use of 
automation to improve efficiencies for both savers/investors and borrowers/fund-raisers. Earlier 
uses of automation have been focused on information and data organisation, such as organising 
borrower information to help the exercise of human judgment in making underwriting decisions.167 
Such automation is able to take the ‘manual chores’ out of the financial intermediation processes 
and achieve operational efficiency, complementing the exercise of human judgement. The efficiency 
savings would likely also be experienced by borrowers as there is less delay in waiting for approvals 
for mortgages or other credit, 168 and borrowers would be assured a process where information 
about them has been comprehensively collected, and consistently organised and used.  
However automation innovation is also driven by human curiosity that wishes to see how far 
artificial intelligence can be developed. 169 Increasingly, artificial intelligence is used to substitute for 
the judgment functions that humans carry out in the financial intermediation processes. Two key 
trends are robo-advice and algorithmic trading. We turn to robo-advice and will return to 
algorithmic trading to be discussed in the next Part. 
Robo-advisors have arisen in the financial services marketplace as a cost-effective means for small 
investors to obtain investment advice that is tailor-made. They are essentially automated interfaces 
that offer investment advice and discretionary investment management services without the 
intervention of a human adviser, using algorithms and asset allocation models that are advertised as 
being tailored to each individual’s investment needs.  
Robo-advisers take the information automation developments in the industry to a new level. They 
could be fed with significant amounts of information on investment products, risk classifications and 
forward-looking information, and they could be made to perform the mapping task between such 
information and investor information that is provided to them. The robustness of the mapping 
exercise would largely depend on whether the robo-adviser is programmed in such a way as to be 
able to categorise investor information well and make the right interpretations out of them. 
Commentators have mixed views on whether robo-advisers can robustly map and interpret investor 
information accurately and then ‘recommend’ a range of suitable products to investors. Supporting 
commentators are of the view that the robo-adviser is a genuine low-cost investment adviser for 
small investors, and serves the purpose of financial inclusion and access.170 Robo-advice can in 
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principle be promoted even if the robo-advising capabilities need to be refined. Further, the robo-
adviser is seen to be more capable of consistent interpretation and application of information.171  
However, Fein voices scepticism of robo-advisers as they are seen to be unable to substitute for 
certain capabilities of human judgment, and hence cannot discharge the fiduciary standard of care 
or the suitability standard for investment advice that are currently imposed under legislation for US 
investment advisers and broker-dealers.172 In particular, she voices doubts as to robo-advisers’ 
capability to have a holistic view of investors’ portfolio needs. Such holistic or ‘peripheral vision’ in 
exercising judgment about an investor’s portfolio is a human capability that artificial intelligence is 
likely unable to replicate. Further, robo-advisers tend to standardise the information they have been 
provided and are not able to detect nuances in investors’ communications and sentiment. These 
limitations make robo-advisers unable to fully comprehend an investors’ appetite and needs She 
also thinks that robo-advisers suffer from the same agency problems as human advisers, in terms of 
conflicts of interest management, and may in fact be less effective in drawing investors’ attention to 
such matters.173 
We are unlikely to see a rollback on the innovative developments in automation and artificial 
intelligence.174 The profound implications of such change lie primarily in the substitution of human 
labour, and increasingly human judgment, and regulators need to consider if such a development is 
adequately captured within existing conduct of business rules and whether private law bargaining 
and remedies can address investor protection needs. The UK FCA envisions that automated advice 
can be provided without the need for human intervention in the regime of ‘simplified advice’,175 for 
the benefit of retail customers. Nevertheless it is for the providers of such automated portals to 
demonstrate that they meet the same standards of suitability as imposed on investment advisers 
generally. Regulators should consider how evolutions in automation affect the scope of regulated 
entities, the setting of regulatory standards and the attachment of responsibilities and liability.176 
A ‘Disruptive Innovation’ Model in Understanding the Implications of Fintech in Intermediation 
Processes and Interfaces 
Fintech is will constantly push the boundaries in disintermediation, re-intermediation and 
automation, likely focusing on customer user interfaces and the consumer experience.177 Applying 
the ‘disruptive innovation’ framework to such developments, we highlight the ‘changes’ with 
                                                          
171
 Darren Tedesco, ‘I, Robo-Adviser? Creating the Blended Adviser Experience’ (2015) Journal of Financial 
Planning 17. 
172
 Melanie Fein, ‘FINRA’s Report on Robo-Advisors: Fiduciary Implications’ (2016) at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2768295. 
173
 Melanie Fein, ‘Robo-advisers; A Closer Look’ (2015) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2658701. 
174
 Rodrigo Zepeda, ‘The Industrialization Blueprint: Re-engineering the Future of Banking and Financial 
Services’ (2015) The Capco Institute Journal of Financial Transformation 9. 
175
 FCA, Finalised Guidance: Simplified Advice (March 2012) at http://fca.org.uk/static/pubs/guidance/fg12-
10.pdf. 
176
 See for example Scopino’s argument that firms that develop and use automated trading agents that are 
programmed by algorithms should be registered and regulated by the US Commodities and Futures Trading 
Commission, Gregory Scopino, ‘Preparing Financial Regulation for the Second Machine Age: The Need for 
Oversight Of Digital Intermediaries in the Futures Markets’ (2015) Columbia Business Law Review 439. 
177
 Price Waterhouse Coopers, Blurred Lines: How Fintech is Shaping the Financial Services Industry (March 
2016). 
‘substitutive potential’ that are likely to have ‘structural impact’ in order to frame the relevant 
perspectives for regulatory thinking. 
Regulators need to pay attention to the changes in terms of new intermediaries that arise as a result 
of new technologies in intermediation processes and interfaces, and consider if those new industries 
give rise to gaps in investor and consumer protection as well as regulatory arbitrage. It need not be 
assumed that the wholesale extension of regulatory perimeter is always warranted, and indeed the 
adaptation of regulatory design is almost always warranted.  
For example, we are of the view that the FCA’s approach to price comparison websites should be 
refined in light of their comparative properties. Such websites are useful to consumers for 
comparative purposes, and so perhaps conduct of business standards should focus on this particular 
aspect, ensuring that the ‘comparative expectations’ are met. We would like to see specific conduct 
of business rules for example dealing with website capabilities in surveying the whole of the market, 
and explicitly revealing any limitations, and setting out clearly the parameters of comparison and 
how the results should be used. These are different standards from those generally applicable to 
individual advice and thus, conventional conduct of business rules under the UK and EU legislation178 
may be over and under-inclusive at the same time.  
New intermediaries such as information intermediaries for online P2P and crowdfunding portals 
should be monitored, as well as new payment intermediaries such as Apply iPay, Google pay and 
Amazon payments, in order to discern changes in performance and conduct of business aspects that 
affect regulatory objectives. In terms of credit information intermediaries, regulators need to 
consider the market and systemic importance of the accuracy of their representations. It may be 
considered as to whether regulatory principles should be introduced for intermediaries’ internal 
quality systems for the formation of opinions as well as their communication formats.179 In terms of 
payment intermediaries, the regulatory objectives of payment integrity, settlement certainty and 
systemic orderliness should guide regulators in considering how such new payment intermediaries 
should be governed as compared to existing bank-based payment systems and credit card 
providers.180 Further, existing intermediaries who foray into new areas should also be monitored in 
terms of the implications for the existing regulatory parameters. For example, asset managers are 
increasingly becoming important in asset and liquidity transformation, rivalling banks in the 
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importance of these functions, and it is important to monitor their prudential conduct in such 
transformations and impact on systemic risk.181 
In terms of substitutive potential, it is important for regulators to pay special attention to how far 
functions of human judgment may be substituted by fintech innovations that continue to accelerate 
automation in financial services. There may be scope for considering whether some functions should 
not be fully or partly substituted by human judgment and how complementarity with human 
judgment should be preserved. On the other hand, it is also pertinent to consider to what extent the 
substitution for human discretion may indeed improve the principal-agent problems in the client-
intermediary relationship. 
Further, it may be important to qualify the use of automation in risk management and the making of 
prudential judgments, as bank internal models for capital adequacy have been shown to be 
inadequate before the global financial crisis 2007-9, grossly under-estimating risk. Models can be 
manipulated to be overly optimistic in order to avoid regulatory obligations,182 and it is important to 
discern what perverse incentives there are in using automation. Scopino also points out that one of 
the implications of the substitution of human judgment is the reframing of responsibility and liability 
for financial services providers. Robots cannot be directly impugned for the outputs they deliver, 
hence liability and responsibility need to be framed appropriately for the designers and users of such 
interfaces and processes. This is an area fraught with debate as we need to consider whether the 
effects upon the market are important enough for us to define liabilities into strict forms, such as 
adopted in the EU and UK in relation to market manipulation,183 or whether states of mind and 
standards of care are relevant and to what extent.  
Finally in terms of structural impact, the automation and online provision of many financial 
intermediation processes and interfaces will continue to bring major changes in the financial sector. 
The relocation of financial intermediation processes into the virtual sphere raises implications in 
terms of globalisation and the reach of territorial regulation, cyber-risks, confidentiality, and shifts in 
the relational dimensions of the intermediary-client relationship. There is a need for regulators to 
coordinate with each other at the international level in terms of standard-setting as well as global 
surveillance, information sharing and enforcement assistance.184 There is scope to consider the 
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necessity for extra-territorial legislation.185 It is important for regulators to work with technology 
experts and a network of surveillance and enforcement agencies in addressing how cyber-risks may 
affect traditional conceptions of investor protection and intermediary responsibility.186 Finally, 
regulators must also be aware that fintech developments that may appear ‘alternative’ today could 
rapidly become widely adopted and regulators should not be taken by surprise. The judgment-based 
approach187 championed internationally and in the UK can form the basis for a regulatory approach 
that adopts early monitoring and reflective consideration of the key aspects of fintech innovation in 
terms of ‘change’, ‘substitutive potential’ and ‘structural impact’ in considering regulatory 
implications.  
We also think that fintech in intermediary interfaces and processes provides inspiration for possible 
regulatory innovation that will being about significant structural impact. For example, fintech 
advancement could be applied to financial consumer dispute resolution. This is an important 
complement to the structural changes in financial intermediation processes and interfaces. As 
consumers are increasingly promised cost-effective, quick, immediate access to financial 
intermediation services that could be partly or fully automated, why should not consumer disputes 
be capable of resolution within similar principles, frameworks and interfaces? In the UK, there is 
scope to consider developing the Financial Ombudsman service188 in this way.189  
D. Market-places in Finance 
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Finally we turn to how market-places in finance have been constituted and are evolving in order to 
discern the aspects of ‘change’, ‘substitution’ and ‘structural impact’ that may inform regulatory 
considerations. 
Market-places in financial instruments used to tend towards centralisation. This is because the 
network effects of users favour consolidating transactions in a dominant marketplace where 
transactions can be more efficiently executed. The rise of national stock exchanges for corporate 
securities reflected this particular tendency.190  However, the rise of market monopolies or 
oligopolies has produced uncompetitive effects,191 and this has led to a deliberate policy movement 
in the US, UK and EU to foster market competition, ie to stimulate a market for markets.192 The 
development of market competition in the UK was led by harmonised EU legislation. Policy 
intervention in this area may be regarded as addressing a market failure, but may also be regarded 
as distorting. Nevertheless, such policy intervention has produced a largely fragmented state of 
financial market structures. Inter-market competition and fragmentation has become a structural 
reality in financial marketplaces. Against this context, we will discuss recent developments such as 
dark pools, trading innovations and even alternative ‘utopian’ marketplaces denominated in 
unconventional value carriers (such as private currencies like bitcoin). 
The Fragmented Markets Phenomenon 
In the US, UK and EU an array of marketplaces cater for broker-dealers’ trading activities, from 
national exchanges in New York, London and Frankfurt to electronic networks set up by brokerages 
and investment banks, such as BATS which consolidated with Chi-X, Instinet (bought by Nomura) and 
Archipelago which was consolidated with the NYSE. We could also consider investment banks’ order 
books as internal marketplaces; internalisation being frequently practiced in the EU. Into the picture 
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we should add newer developments such as ‘dark pools’193 which are closed networks that do not 
display price transparency and are intended for the execution of usually large orders where traders 
prefer anonymity. 
Market fragmentation is the result of policy support for market competition. Such policy support is 
arguably not unwarranted as commentators have found that indicators of market quality have 
improved with competition between fragmented markets. A survey of literature indicates broadly 
that price discovery has improved, i.e. bid-ask spreads on markets have reduced194 and transaction 
fees have been reduced.195 Further, market fragmentation caters to the needs of different traders,196 
and the rise of dark pools is a case in point. Dark pools have arisen primarily as venues where 
institutional investors could anonymously trade large orders of securities without unduly exposing 
themselves or affecting price movements in the open market.197 However, they are controversial as 
they do not practice price transparency198 and therefore cause adverse selection. They can be seen 
to be a place that steals the liquidity that institutional orders would have offered to open 
marketplaces.199 In such dark pools, the less transparent environment may also be used by brokers 
towards abusive ends, such as the carrying out of proprietary trading that is detrimental to the 
interests of their clients.200 It is inconclusive if liquidity across fragmented markets, including 
secretive dark pools, is reduced overall.201  
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In critically evaluating the pros and cons of market fragmentation, one needs to bear in mind the 
effects of regulatory intervention. Where markets are in competition as such (without any regulatory 
policy that addresses the adverse effects of such competition), the increase in information cost for 
brokers and investors and the reduced pools of liquidity in each fragmented venue could result in 
adverse selection cost, worse price efficiency, liquidity and transaction outcomes for individual 
trades.202 It could be argued that fragmented markets only work and demonstrate beneficial effects 
as a result of regulatory intervention in the US, UK and EU that foster a level playing field.203 In other 
words, policy-makers’ fostering of market competition results in a form of ‘controlled competition’, 
as regulation promotes efficient capital markets effects but also sets out to prevent certain market 
failures.  
We argue that the focus on market competition and the fostering of fragmented markets has 
produced two pronounced effects. One is that marketplaces have become commoditised and are 
less incentivised to take on broader governance roles in the interests of maintaining market order 
and stability. Macey and O’Hara204 argue that market competition has made it too costly for markets 
to introduce governance structures for vetting issuers and traders, as capturing their fees and rents 
have become a predominant concern. Further, Yadav205 also doubts that marketplaces are 
sufficiently incentivised to invest enough to maintain market order and stability. Under-investment 
in governance by markets has resulted in a governance gap for overall market order and stability. 
However, the UK FCA continues to gently nudge dark pools towards optimal self-governing 
behaviour and prefers a non-intrusive approach.206 It is questioned whether this is consistent with 
the forward-looking regulatory approach the UK regulator has adopted. One of the most-cited 
recent episodes of market instability was the Flash Crash of May 2010 on the New York Stock 
Exchange where for 30 minutes, a range of securities lost significant market value in a rapid selling 
episode that depressed their prices. The Flash Crash was attributed to the temporary lack of liquidity 
in the market for the affected stocks after a large sell order of index futures failed to be executed 
immediately, forcing a downward spiral of price in a rapid trading environment.207 It is only after the 
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Flash Crash that the NYSE updated their circuit breakers for the new trading environment, so that 
trading suspensions can be introduced beyond a certain threshold of abnormal price slide.208 The 
belated response in considering the market risks of such trading practices and to put in place 
appropriate governance and control shows the reluctance of marketplaces to invest in costly 
governance and control.  
Much greater regulatory control over marketplaces in the UK and EU has to an extent attempted to 
address the governance deficit. The EU Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 2014 imposes on 
all markets the obligation to monitor and detect market abuse, report abnormalities and put in place 
controls and governance for resilience purposes such as circuit breakers.209 This regime has been 
transposed in UK legislation. The MiFID’s regime seems to show that persistent regulatory oversight 
and intervention is a necessary condition for the healthier aspects of market competition to be 
reaped while controlling for its externalities.  
Second, market competition has induced a cultural shift towards emphasis on trading and market 
arbitrage, disengaging the role of markets from being long-term allocators of investment for the real 
economy.210 The support for market competition and the maintenance of short term price efficiency 
encourages myopic trading and short-termism.211 The adverse long-term effects and welfare-
destruction effects of short termism have been highlighted212 but continue to be given inadequate 
consideration in policy development. Regulators, in their overwhelming support for the immediate 
benefits of market competition have persisted with a quiet trade-off of longer term goals. This 
inherent bias is something that regulators need to address in considering any regulatory implications 
for fintech innovation in marketplaces. 
The backdrop of regulatory favour for market competition explains to an extent the development of 
financial innovation in marketplaces focused on achieving more profitable and less risky trading, in 
the form of algorithmic and high-frequency trading. 
Trading Innovations 
Profits in finance are increasingly being made in trading as intermediaries act as traders exploiting 
opportunities for value arbitrage.213 As mentioned above, short-termist trading is now the norm on 
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financial markets. It could be argued that such short-termist pursuit of price efficiency aligns with 
long-term allocative welfare.214 However, if short term prices are not nearly as efficient as one 
hopes,215 then short term value arbitraging results in zero gum games that are carried out with 
complete obliviousness to the impact on the long term.216 Cautionary voices are however in a 
minority as policy-makers subject to short-termist democratic politics themselves, are not keen to 
take stronger stands against the rise of the trading culture. In such a context, trading innovations 
have flourished, in particular, algorithmic and high frequency trading. 
Algorithmic trading involves the use of computer programmed algorithms to execute trades 
automatically, such programmes embedding certain risk management practices defined by traders. 
In a simplistic way, this is another technological development that replaces human labour by 
machines whose programmed executions would be quicker and much more consistent than human 
judgments. Moreover, with the use of increasingly sophisticated computers, more comprehensive 
data analytics can inform algorithmic trading. Today’s high frequency trading is based on an 
information processing capacity far exceeding the human capacity, and is able to take place in 
milliseconds, approaching the speed of light.217 
It may be argued that the rise of high frequency trading (HFT) has greatly exacerbated the focus on 
the trading culture, as traders try to profit from slivers of value arbitrage, driving short-termism to 
an extreme.218 Commentators document that high frequency traders embark on a high volume and 
low margin strategy, which, aided by the speed and the relatively short span of exposure, creates 
very little risk for traders. For example, traders may enter many passive orders into a market to 
capture liquidity rebates offered by markets and cancel them very quickly after that so that gains are 
made without any risky exposure.219 Another tactic is layering, where many orders at marginally 
increasing prices are entered and cancelled, resulting in slower traders responding to the increasing 
bids. The high frequency traders then capture trades at the much higher bids that has been induced 
by the layering.220 HFT also involves capturing small advantages in the speed of obtaining market 
information. For example, many HFT firms rent space very close to exchange servers so that they 
may obtain a millisecond advantage in public information releases before information arrives at 
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slower markets. This practice is known as co-location. Such information advantage allows HFT firms 
to gain a trading advantage over the rest of the market.221  
It may be argued that such new forms of competitive innovation should not raise alarm as value 
arbitrage has been sought by traders long before the advent of such technology.222 Capital markets 
are at best semi-strong efficient, so traders have always sought to exploit inefficiencies to make 
private gains.223 Such behaviour is not new to human nature. Empirical researchers on HFT also find 
that markets with HFT participation enjoy beneficial effects, in terms of price discovery224 and 
liquidity,225 though more arguably, lower price volatility.226 Of course one could argue that the 
overall market effects, even if beneficial, are at a broad level only. At the micro level, those that have 
traded with HFTs have been subject to exploitation and worse, predatory trading. The slower trader 
who transacted with the HFT in a layered market has incurred an adverse selection cost.227 HFTs that 
appear to supply constant liquidity are also themselves liquidity takers.228 HFT has the potential of 
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splitting up large institutional orders to obtain best prices across different markets, but also has the 
potential of sniffing out large institutional orders in dark pools and executing against them at less 
than sub-optimal prices for the institutional investor.229 
Although some HFT practices are arguably competitive innovations not involving market abuse, 
commentators raise questions over (a) the fairness or otherwise of engaging in such innovative 
advantage; (b) the potential for HFT to sponsor market abuse and (c) how HFT may undermine 
regulatory objectives such as financial and market stability. 
Regulators seem hesitant on making a judgment on (a).  As mentioned earlier, HFT has consistently 
shown to produce beneficial short-term effects in market quality, making prices more efficient and 
generally providing more and constant liquidity. However, the process of making prices more 
efficient generally involve exploiting a less-quickly informed or less rapid trader, and the ‘unfairness’ 
at the micro transactional level needs to be addressed.230 The arguments in favour of market 
efficiency should not totally drown the concerns regarding the ethics of individual ‘harms’ that are 
caused.231 Further, a market that favours the competitive advantage enjoyed by HFT firms would 
only provoke a socially useless arms race in trading innovation.232  Commentators urge that certain 
market practices exacerbate the already unfair advantage HFT firms have and would need to be 
scrutinised. For example, co-location gives HFT firms an advantage in information although this 
advantage is open to any who can rent such space.233 Further, HFTs that subscribe to preferential 
data feeds that are sent a fraction of a second before such feeds are made for public release also 
have an arguably unfair information advantage.234 Exchanges also practice flash orders, ie to allow 
HFT firms to briefly see an order before it appears on the open market if it is not immediately 
executable. This again undermines the level playing field in the markets.235 The SEC’s recent fines 
imposed on Barclays and Credit Suisse could be key to nailing down the undesirable practice of flash 
orders.236 The SEC enforcement action was based on the banks’ misrepresentation to their investors 
that their dark pools are fair when they in fact practise flash orders to HFT firms. Although the flash 
orders were not themselves the subject of enforcement, such enforcement could go some way in 
articulating a firmer regulatory position about them. 
                                                          
229
 Merritt Fox, Lawrence Glosten and Gabriel Rauterberg, ‘The New Stock Market: Sense and Nonsense’ 
(2015) 65 Duke Law Journal  191. 
230
 Michael J Aitken, Angelo Aspris, Sean Foley and Frederic H de B Harris, ‘Market Fairness: The Poor Country 
Cousin of Market Efficiency’ (2014) at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2440671. 
231
 Michael Davis, Andrew Kumiega and Ben van Vliet, ‘Ethics, Finance, and Automation: A Preliminary Survey 
of Problems in High Frequency Trading’ (2013) 19 Science Engineering and Ethics 851. 
232
 Camillo von Muller, ‘Regulating High Frequency Trading: A Micro-Level Analysis of Spatial Behavior, Optimal 
Choices, and Pareto-Efficiency in High Speed Markets’  (2012) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2000119. 
233
 Charles R Korsmo, ‘High Frequency Trading- A Regulatory Strategy’ (2013) 48 University of Richmond Law 
Review 523; Steven McNamara, ‘The Law and Ethics of High-Frequency Trading’ (2016) 17 Minnesota Journal 
of Law, Science & Technology 71. But the practice of co-location is arguably legitimised in the EU as the 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 2014 adopts the practice of co-location as part of the definition of 
HFT. There is thus no policy move towards regarding this practice as ‘unfair’. 
234
 Steven McNamara, ‘The Law and Ethics of High-Frequency Trading’ (2016) 17 Minnesota Journal of Law, 
Science & Technology 71. 
235
 Steven McNamara, ‘The Law and Ethics of High-Frequency Trading’ (2016) 17 Minnesota Journal of Law, 
Science & Technology 71. 
236
 Both banks have been fined, see ‘Barclays and Credit Suisse are fined over US 'dark pools'’, BBCNews (1 Feb 
2016). 
On (b), although the majority of HFT practices are to capture slivers of value arbitrage, the superior 
technology of HFT can be used towards market abuse and it may be rather difficult to detect such 
behaviour or pin it down as being abusive. It may be argued that the current regulatory framework 
should be able to capture HFTs demonstrating anti-social behaviour and market abuse. In this way, 
HFT is not itself a problem. 237 However, certain HFT practices push the boundaries of current 
regulatory definitions, such as layering. One could argue that layering is a form of market abuse as it 
is a rapid version of pump and dump, causing market prices to rise by the layered orders and then 
seeking to execute at a much higher price at the expense of the counterparty.238 On the other hand, 
layering involves rapid cancellation, unlike pump and dump, and so market information is technically 
not distorted, except that slower traders have not had a chance to process them in such rapid fire. 
The governance gaps raised by the capabilities of HFT need to be looked into.  
Finally, market practices do not merely have transactional and efficiency impact, and could at a 
broader level affect market and financial stability. Financial stability in particular has been overtly 
embraced as a key public good and regulatory objective239 in the wake of the global financial crisis 
2008-9. Commentators exhort that it is not sufficient to assume that marketplaces will work 
optimally, and that the micro-efficiencies in marketplaces will align with wider phenomena such as 
financial stability.240 Micro-efficient behaviour could indeed result in pro-cyclical and herding 
behaviour that is damaging to overall market and financial stability.241 It is arguable that HFT, which 
augments micro-efficient behaviour to the hilt, could have a particularly adverse impact on financial 
stability. HFT is largely automated and may not be able to nimbly respond to abnormal market 
conditions or significant changes.242 In such a situation, the rapid trading automation of HFT would 
exacerbate pro-cyclical actions that could cause already difficult market conditions to more rapidly 
slide into crisis.243 In other words, HFT may not be responsible for bringing about difficult market 
conditions such as a decline in liquidity or falling asset prices. But it could be used to exacerbate 
them and very rapidly too, making it difficult for interventions to take place for the stabilisation of 
markets. Thus, the systemic risk impact of HFT trading has been flagged up for scrutiny,244 and the 
HFT firms that benefit from exploiting such technology should arguably be called upon to ensure 
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that the technology is used, governed and controlled in a manner responsible for the maintenance 
of market and financial stability. 
We are also of the view that the relationship between trading innovations and longer term 
consequences such as long-term allocative efficiency in the real economy and wealth distribution of 
financial gains must be considered.245 Otherwise the era of trading innovations would take us into an 
insular world of micro-efficiency and speed without reference to wider and long-term impact. 
Trading innovations such as HFT have not gained a salutary social reputation,246 and are contributing 
towards a wider perception that financial elites dominate the financial markets, disempowering and 
disenfranchising less sophisticated users.247  
Although dynamic innovations in trading technology are being introduced by financial-cum-
technology elites, an increasingly small and alienating group of experts, other fintech innovations 
arise to challenge such market developments. Alternative markets, which are supported to a certain 
extent by anti-establishment ideologies, are arising. The next Section turns to a very different market 
development- private markets denominated in alternative currencies such as bitcoin which is 
supported by blockchain technology. 
Private Alternative Markets- Bitcoin and Blockchain 
One of fintech’s poster-children would be new digital currencies such as bitcoin supported by the 
blockchain technology. In essence bitcoin is non-government backed private ‘money’, which is not 
regarded as legal tender in most jurisdictions, but is increasingly accepted on a private basis as a 
means of exchange.248 The concept of money developed from ancient times as a means of exchange 
with intrinsic value (such as gold and silver coins) to predominantly a means of exchange backed by 
sovereigns and law.249 However, the concept of intrinsic value has not become totally irrelevant as 
money is used as a means to store value, meaning that its commodity value is still important, but 
such value has become, for most currencies, reflected in the price that the markets are willing to pay 
for the currency. 
Private money is not a new phenomenon and has largely flourished in closed networks.250 For 
example, digital currencies exclusive to online games, such as ‘gold’ in the popular World of Warcraft. 
Bitcoin is another digital currency, but it is potentially capable of breaking boundaries largely 
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because it is supported by blockchain technology that aims to create the institution and 
infrastructure for exchange in the real economy. 
The technical working of blockchain technology has been extensively documented elsewhere.251 In 
brief, it is a distributed ledger technology that maintains a single record of all transactions. Every 
record of transaction is created by market participants using secure cryptography to ensure that 
every transaction is initiated and authorised, and then verified and sealed by volunteer software 
experts (called miners). The record created is then indelible and irreversible. This technology has the 
potential of bolstering confidence in the ordinary commercial use of bitcoin, as the main risk with 
the use of such private money, ie fraud and double-spending,252 is minimised. Supported by 
blockchain technology, private ‘bitcoin-based’ economies could arise across borders on the 
worldwide web, and constitute alternative commercial and financial markets to conventional 
ones.253  
The development of such alternative markets has attracted some regulatory support254 as being 
prima facie not inconsistent with policy-makers’ bias towards market competition. However, 
regulatory response is mixed at the international level, as the ‘alternative’ nature of such economies 
necessarily poses some threat to states and regulators.255 Some commentators see the creation of 
such a decentralised and private economic phenomenon as truly liberating, as existing political or 
systemic shackles to economic development could be overcome by the creation of new institutions. 
It is suggested that the blockchain technology enables new institutional structures such as 
decentralised autonomous institutions to arise, to replace centrally governed institutions. These 
decentralised institutions have the potential to be more sophisticated than conventional ones and 
are automatically coordinating in ways that are efficient.256 For example, investors in a private 
‘bitcoin-based’ financial investment economy could be freed of the shackles of existing intermediary 
structures in the financial sector and invest without being subject to extensive principal-agent 
problems.257 The private money economy of crypto-currencies and blockchain could truly support 
development and the unbanked in the developing world.258 It is also suggested that private money 
economies such as denominated in bitcoin would develop economies of scale in due course and a lex 
cryptographia will arise to establish standards of use and behaviour, and dispute resolution, much 
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like the development of the ‘law merchant’ for international trade from days of old.259 Private 
‘bitcoin-based’ markets and economies embody for some the utopian ideals of new democracy and 
not just new commercial opportunities.260 
However, the rise of such alternative private money-based economies faces great challenges. Such 
alternative economies are fraught with risks relating to the lack of governance,261 exploitation by 
fraudsters and criminals262 and the inherent vulnerabilities of code.263 Further, participants in such 
alternative markets and economies must fully bear the market risks of bitcoin. Bitcoin can be subject 
to hyper-inflation or deflation as its value,264 not backed by sovereigns and determined in relatively 
small user markets, can be highly unstable. This could be the Achilles heel of bitcoin-backed 
alternative markets, making them relatively unscalable. Where such alternative markets remain 
relatively small and closed, regulatory intervention may be limited and proportionate, targeting 
fraud, money laundering and terrorist financing,265 while leaving performance and behaviour issues 
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Further, governments266 and established institutions267 are interested in developing the blockchain 
technology to enhance existing infrastructure. Hence, the biggest uses of blockchain could be 
deployed in securities clearing, settlement and custodial functions, or in international payments and 
transfers made by established financial institutions. Incumbents’ adoption of the blockchain 
technology could overshadow its functions in the private currency-backed markets and create 
incentives to impede blockchain innovation for such markets. Incumbents could carry out significant 
investment and coordination among different systems used in different parts of the financial 
sector,268 and make blockchain technology both mainstream and proprietised, deviating from its  
open source roots. Volunteer miners could now become professionally employed to work on and 
develop proprietary systems. The impact of proprietary commercialisation of the blockchain 
technology sector could significantly and adversely affect the development of an open source block-
chain supporting the private money markets/economies.  
Although the rise of private ‘bitcoin-based’ markets and economies seem to pose a much-touted 
disruptive challenge to existing markets, we are at a highly dynamic point in witnessing such 
development, and the article is sceptical of the enduring quality of this phenomenon. Bitcoin 
deviations have already developed, such as Litecoin and Dogecoin, and the competitive forces 
supporting such decentralisation are only likely to foster more fragmentation and less potency 
against the organised endeavours of incumbent institutions to harvest the potential of blockchain 
technology. Regulatory interventions such as the New York bitlicence269 may indeed be needed to 
bolster the competitive future of bitcoin! 
A ‘Disruptive Innovation’ Model in Understanding the Implications of Fintech in Financial Market-
places 
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In financial market-places, the key change that took place was led by policy-makers promoting 
market competition. Although policy-makers could not foresee the ‘disruptive’ changes that would 
be brought about by a proliferation of electronic trading venues, this ‘managed disruption’ took 
place under a rubric of overarching regulatory principles that supported immediate and salient price 
transparency,270 rigorous internal control and governance for markets,271 obligations imposed on 
markets to monitor and report abuse swiftly272 and the trade-through rule in the US highlighted 
earlier. Many of the positive findings on market quality in the US, UK and EU could be due to such a 
‘managed disruption’ process.  
In this light, the rise of dark pools would not be unforeseen, and neither should innovative practices 
in trading. Current regulatory principles are able to capture within its scope misbehaviour in dark 
pools. In the UK and EU, rules on best execution, fair and clear investor communication and market 
abuse are able to address principal-agent abuses, fraudulent and market abuse behaviour. The UK 
and EU protect retail investors by a best execution rule premised on best consideration,273 and 
institutional investors by a best execution rule defined by a range of factors that matter to such 
investors.274 The UK has in particular imposed a general principle of fair, clear and not misleading 
investor communications,275 and so would be able to reach the same decision as the SEC in enforcing 
against dark pools that were misrepresented to investors. The UK and EU’s market abuse regime is 
premised on strict liability for having caused distortive effects on the market,276 and hence the use of 
HFT that results in those effects can be subject to market abuse enforcement. It however remains to 
be seen if practices such as layering would be indicted. The EU has introduced ex ante governance of 
HFT systems by requiring firms to ensure that robust risk controls, business continuity plans and 
internal governance are in place. Further, an HFT that engages in trading patterns such as making 
two-way markets in simultaneous orders would be regarded as a market-maker under EU legislation 
and is obliged to provide liquidity on a predictable basis.277 Trades that are carried out via 
algorithmic trading are also required to be reported with that identification, allowing regulatory 
monitoring of the impact of such trading on markets.278  
Financial markets innovation are consistent with the ‘managed disruption’ sanctioned by policy-
makers who have introduced market competition policies. Regulators are generally benign towards 
such innovation while proportionately protecting stability in markets. The danger however of such a 
‘managed disruption’ process is that there is a policy presumption of favour of competitive market 
innovations and it could become difficult to persuade policy-makers to deal adequately with sub-
optimal aspects. The ‘unfairness’ aspect of co-location or preferential data feeds for HFT firms raised 
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by a number of commentators above are unlikely to be addressed.279 The adverse selection cost for 
investors trading on the opposite side of an HFT firm remains a private cost that regulators are 
unlikely to intervene to address. 
The entrenched policy preference for short-term market efficiency as a healthy manifestation of 
market competition would obscure questions addressed at long-term welfare consequences. 
Fragmented, competitive markets and a pro-innovation culture in trading cement structural changes 
in financial marketplaces, making them places for ruthless competition, zero sum games and short-
termist gains. This short-termist trading culture has been lamented in the UK as being contributory 
to an unhealthy short-termist culture in the corporate sector,280  increasingly disengaged from 
investing in the real economy for the long term.281 Although the UK exhorts institutional investors to 
behave in a long-termist manner by soft law,282 and the EU283 is concerned that institutional 
investors should account for how they manage their portfolios for the long-term interests of 
beneficiaries, these concerns seem only tepidly addressed compared to the overwhelming policy 
support for short-term efficient markets and the trading culture in these markets.    
On the ‘change’ ushered in by private markets or economies denominated in bitcoin, we think such 
‘change’ is slightly less certain in its substitutive potential. Although some regulators are generally 
supportive in the same pro-competition spirit, they are also ready to intervene if material risks such 
as money laundering, terrorist financing, fraud and consumer protection become significant issues of 
concern.284 The compliance cost for developing such alternative markets at a larger scale could 
become forbidding. Further, as the blockchain technology can be harnessed by incumbent financial 
institutions, the increasing proprietisation and forked developments of such technology could create 
a negative impact for alternative markets denominated in bitcoin. We doubt that such alternative 
markets or economies are likely to pose a serious substitutive threat285 but could be allowed to exist 
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as parallel systems with conventional markets and economies as long as no systemic risk issues or 
financial crime are implicated. 
E. Conclusion 
This article suggests a high-level framework in which to study the nature, risks and regulatory 
implications of fintech innovation today. The ‘disruptive innovation’ framework proposed by 
business school academics is able to help regulators identify changes in entities, practices, 
methodologies and even ideologies and culture in the financial sector, and to consider the 
substitutive potential of such changes. Significant substitutive potential can give rise to structural 
impact in the financial sector, replacing incumbent entities, practices, methodologies, and markets 
or creating significant alternative institutions alongside incumbent ones. This framework of studying 
change, substitutive potential and structural impact can inform regulators of the need to evaluate if 
regulatory scope is adequate, whether regulatory principles will continue to meet regulatory 
objectives such as investor protection and financial stability, and whether regulatory rules and 
prescription need updating and adaptation to new practices and methodologies. We applied this 
framework to study key trends in fintech innovations in financial products, intermediation and 
markets.  
The ‘disruptive innovation’ framework applies not only to a study of fintech for the purposes of 
regulatory considerations, but also to financial innovation that does not have a fintech element, such 
as certain aspects of shadow banking.286 Further, this framework is also useful for regulators to 
consider whether they should introduce certain policy frameworks to initiate structural changes, 287 
such as in supporting financial market competition.  
The introduction of a high-level framework, consistent with understandings in business innovation, is 
important so that regulators may have a useful ‘blue print’ for appraising financial innovation. Over 
the longer term, such a blue print contributes towards the development of a more effective 
regulatory culture that can anticipate developments and carry out consistent policy approaches. 
Regulators should not take a hands-off position and leave financial innovations to be evaluated only 
by financial elites. Regulators should also not adopt knee jerk reactions to new developments and 
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extend unsuitable regulatory frameworks over them.288 Finally, regulators should try to avoid being 
caught entirely by surprise if a fallout results from certain financial innovation, as much more is now 
expected of the new forward-looking approach to financial regulation.289 We cannot expect zero 
failure but regulators need to equip themselves with suitable frameworks for high-level perspectives 
and policy design in order to exercise powers appropriately in supplying the public goods of financial 
stability and investor protection. 
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